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NOTES
TAXATION OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS: A
VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT1
RIGHTS OR AN INNOVATIVE TOOL IN THE
WAR AGAINST DRUGS?
One sure way to determine the social conscience of a Gov-
ernment is to examine the way taxes are collected and how
they are spent.... Taxes, after all, are the dues that we pay
for the privileges of living in an organized society.2
The nation's drug problem has had a sweeping impact politi-
cally, socially and economically.3 While the American taxpayer
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against compelled self-incrimination. Id. It reads, in pertinent part: "[No person]
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." Id. The Fifth
Amendment also protects against a second prosecution or punishment for the same offense.
Id. The Amendment states: "No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb[.I" Id.
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Worcester, Mass., In 1776 the Fight Was
for Democracy in Taxation. In 1936 That Is Still the Fight., (Oct. 21, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 522, 523 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1938).
3 See DAVm W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A DRUG
WAR 1 (1994) (noting that Office of Drug Control Policy's creation of "drug czar" in 1989
symbolized political commitment against drug use); THEODORE R. VALLANCE, PROHIBITION'S
SECOND FAILURE 1 (1993) (discussing America's drug problem and its negative impact on
public health, law enforcement, politics and society); FRANKLIN E. ZImnG & GORDON HAW-
KiNs, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL xi (1992) (describing control of illegal
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has been burdened with the economic cost of fighting this escalat-
ing war against illegal narcotics,4 the drug industry has generated
billions of untaxed dollars each year.' During the last decade,
drugs as "preeminent problem of criminal justice in the United States"); Lionel Barber,
Bush Strategy for Bringing the Drug Problem Under Control, FIN. Tffv1s, Sept. 7, 1989, § I,
at 6 (reporting fear of drugs and attendant crime at all time high); Ross M. LaRoe & John
Charles Pool, Drug Problem Includes More Than Economics, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 5,
1993, at B2 (stating that federal government would spend $13 billion on drug enforcement
in upcoming fiscal year, with approximately $8 billion aimed at reducing supply of drugs
and $5 billion geared towards reducing demand); Mark Ridley-Thomas, Drugs: The
Problems Will Be Compounded If We Fail to See Substance Abuse as An Unprecedented
Health Crises, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1990, at B7 (asserting that demand for illegal drugs is
public health problem, thus public policy must be refocused on education, treatment, early
intervention and research); David Warsh, Neither War Nor Peace Will Solve Drug Problem,
Cm. TRm., July 19, 1992, at 6 (stating drug problem to be "at the very heart of urban
despair").
4 See, e.g., MATHEo FALCO, THE MAKING OF A DRuG-FREE AMERICA: PROGRAMS THAT
WoRK 200 (1992) (noting that 1992 Office of Management and Budget report estimated
national drug abuse costs nation three hundred billion dollars annually in lost productiv-
ity, crime, health care and accidents); Michael J. Martin et al., The Cost of Hospitalization
for Firearm Injuries, 260 JAMA 3048, 3049 (1988) (highlighting 1988 American Medical
Association estimate of one billion dollar cost of treating drug-related gunshot wounds, 85%
of which was absorbed by taxpayers); $60 Billion a Year, Study Says the Cost of the U.S.
Drug Habit, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1989, at A8 (reporting that illegal drug industry consumes
roughly $60 billion per year in tax dollars for law-enforcement, medical and other costs);
William J. Eaton & Sara Fritz, The President's Drug Plan: Democrats Criticize Funding
Plan; Object to Financing Fight on Drugs by Cutting Other Programs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1989, at 10 (stating "[tihis is a war on drugs, not a war on the American taxpayer."); Laurie
Goodstein, Mayors Urge Government to Shift Money to Cities, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1990,
at A4 (suggesting local taxes not sufficient to win war on drugs); Donna Greene, Westches-
ter Q & A-- Robert M. Maccarone; Pulling the Strands Together on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1989, § 12, at 3 (noting that Westchester County, N.Y., spent over 40 million dollars
fighting illegal drugs alone, suggesting that even local government acknowledges impact on
taxpayers of illegal drug activities); Joseph B. Treaster, From the Front Lines of the War on
Drugs, A Few Small Victories, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, § 4, at 5 (estimating that drug
spending would equal $11.62 billion in 1992 with 30%-31% for health-related activities);
Karen A. Trimper, Recent Cocaine Bust Won't Dent Area Drug Trade, BuFFALo NEws, Feb.
10, 1995, at 2 (stating that drug war costs American taxpayers billions of dollars every
year); U.S. to Give State $40 Million to Assist in War on Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30, 1989,
at A10 (reporting that Congress appropriated $395 million for state grants for use in fund-
ing anti-drug abuse programs); Who Pays the Bill?, ECONOMIST, March 18, 1989, at 27 (de-
tailing tremendous costs to federal and state governments of fighting war on drugs). See
generally Grace E. Greer, Cocaine Wars: Are the Taxpayers Really Winning?, 20 Sw. U. L.
REV. 419, 437 (1991) (discussing that taxpayers will be forced to bear financial burden of
forfeiture laws); Steven Jones, The Drug War: Myth, Reality & Politics, 27 CONN. L. REV.
623, 637 (1995) (explaining that by locking up non-violent drug offenders, drug war wastes
taxpayer dollars); Steven J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessonsfrom Economics, 1994 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (attributing increased emergency room
admissions to drug use and generally discussing public health ramifications).
5 See, e.g., John Caher, Greenberg Says Tax Increase Needed to Fund Assault on Drugs,
TIns UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 19, 1989, at B2 (indicating that drug industry grosses
$150 billion per year); Chi Chi Sileo, Addiction to Change: Supporters of Drug-Law Reform
Split on Method, WASH. Tuns, Feb. 16, 1994, at A7 (noting that drug trade is flourishing
with annual profit of $50 billion to $100 billion); Jann S. Wenner, Drug War: A New Viet-
nam?, N.Y. Tunms, June 23, 1990, at A23 (reporting that black market in illegal drugs nets
approximately $50 to $60 billion per year in profits from organized crime); Martin Wolf,
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state legislatures have recognized this apparent inequity.6 As a
result, a growing number of states have enacted statutes imposing
various forms of taxes on those who unlawfully possess or deal in
controlled substances. 7
Taxing unlawful gains reflects legislative attempts to hold ac-
countable those who perpetuate and benefit from the drug trade.8
While taxation of illegal narcotics may seem an obvious and prac-
tical method to fund the war on drugs, the need to comport with
constitutional limitations has impeded state legislation.9
This Note examines contemporary drug tax statutes and the
constitutional challenges they have sparked. Part I discusses the
historical background of the government's power to tax unlawful
Thinking About Drug Legislation, FIN. Tvms (London), Sept. 4, 1989, at 119 (estimating
U.S. drug revenues at approximately $80 billion per year).6 See, e.g., infra note 50 (listing enacted drug tax statutes); Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Reve-
nue, 605 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1992) (upholding Illinois' drug tax statute because tax im-
posed is rationally related to legislative intent requiring reimbursement to State by those
who benefit from illegal drug use); Ann L. Iijima, The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Falls Victim to State Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 101, 101 (1994) (explaining that recent enactment of drug tax statutes indi-
cates legislative response to increasing public concern regarding illegal drug use); Patricia
Morgan, Money Laundering, The Internal Revenue Service and Enforcement Priorities, 43
FLA. L. REv. 939, 940-41 (1991) (highlighting tension between policy goal of controlling
criminal conduct and cost); Robert E. Tomasson, 21 States Imposing Drug Tax and Then
Fining the Evaders, N.Y. Tmis, Dec. 23, 1990, at Al (reporting that growing number of
states are tapping vast proceeds gained from drug sales through use of tax code to impose
liability on drug traffickers).
7 See Iijima, supra note 6, at 101-02 & 102 n.1 (noting that in 1986 Minnesota became
one of first states to enact drug tax statute and by 1994 twenty-four states had enacted
similar statutes); see also infra part II (describing provisions of state drug tax statutes).
8 See ALA. CODE § 40-17A-16 (1993) (noting intent of drug tax statute is "to levy this tax
upon illegal drugs in an effort to compensate for the lost revenue from a section of the
economy that has not heretofore borne its fair share of the tax burden"); James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961) (recognizing injustice of relieving embezzlers of paying
income taxes on embezzled funds while requiring that honest people pay taxes on every
conceivable type of income); Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120, 124 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991) (finding Alabama's drug tax serves remedial purpose of assessing taxes upon
those who previously escaped taxation), cert. denied, Exparte Briney, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 171
(Ala. 1992); see also HARRY G. BALTER, TAx FRAUD & EVASION § 1.02[1] (5th ed. 1983) (ex-
plaining that appropriateness of taxing illegally produced income is based on premise that
failure to do so would unfairly shift tax burden to law-abiding taxpayers); James M. Curley,
Comment, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 75 B.U. L.
REv. 505, 508 (1995) (describing Supreme Court's decision in Kurth Ranch as restrictive on
states' ability to transfer costs associated with illegal-drug trade onto those who engender
them); Tomasson, supra note 6, at Al (acknowledging economic appropriateness of drug tax
statutes despite constitutional issues).
9 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968). In this case, the Supreme Court
recognized that an interrelationship exists between the government's power to tax and the
concomitant constitutional limitations on that power. Id. The Court noted that the Consti-
tution requires full recognition of Congressional taxing powers and of measures reasonably
incidental to their exercise. Id. The Court, however, is equally obliged to adhere to constitu-
tional restrictions which permit the exercise of those powers. Id.; see also infra part III(discussing constitutional challenges against state taxation of illegal narcotics).
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activities, including illegal drugs. While early cases were incon-
sistent, it eventually became firmly established that the govern-
ment may constitutionally impose a tax on unlawful gains. Part II
scrutinizes current provisions of drug tax statutes and their con-
stitutional implications. The statutes most likely to invoke consti-
tutional challenges are those that do not provide for taxpayers'
confidentiality or those that impose an unreasonably high tax.
Part III analyzes possible constitutional challenges to drug tax
laws and evaluates their ability to withstand such challenges.
While most challenges stem from claims of self-incrimination or
double jeopardy, these concerns can be addressed via confidential-
ity provisions and appropriate levels of taxation. Finally, Part IV
recommends specific statutory characteristics which will satisfy
the goal of producing effective legislation within the boundaries of
the United States Constitution. This Note will conclude that drug
tax statutes can be effectively drafted to comport with taxpayers'
constitutional rights and still achieve the goal of raising revenue
to help fight the war on drugs.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As early as 1864, Congress exercised its power to tax10 by levy-
ing license taxes on individuals who profited from illegal activi-
ties." One statute which imposed a tax on those dealing in lottery
tickets or liquor resulted in taxpayer challenges alleging that Con-
gress did not have the power to tax ill-gotten gains.' 2 The
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Article I provides in part: "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . ." Id.
11 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 73, 13 Stat. 248, 249, 252; Act of March 3, 1865, ch.
78, 13 Stat. 472, 485; Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 113, 116, 137, 141.
12 See License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 463 (1866). The License Tax Cases represented a
consolidation of nine cases which were brought before the Court, and arising under inter-
nal revenue acts relating to licenses for selling liquor and to taxes on dealing in lotteries.
Id. The defendants essentially argued that the federal license and tax statutes were in
direct conflict with state legislation which prohibited the very acts which Congress sought
to tax, thus implying condonation of the activity. Id. at 467. They challenged as contradic-
tory state power to deter and to punish crime, and federal power to levy a tax from revenue
from the same crime, arguing that the two could not coexist; that is, the taxing power must
yield to the objective to deter and punish. Id. The statute provided that anyone engaged in
the business of selling lottery tickets or dealing in liquor must obtain a license (later
amended to "special tax") from the federal government. Id. at 463. The act further stipu-
lated that any license granted or tax paid could not be construed to authorize any activity
prohibited by the statute, so as to prevent the taxation of that very activity. Id. The Court
essentially stated that taxes may be imposed on revenue derived from illegal conduct, and
furthermore, such tax does not in any way validate or authorize the activity taxed. Id.
[Vol. 11:747
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Supreme Court ruled, in the License Tax Cases,13 that Congress
was within its right to impose taxes on revenue from conduct
deemed illegal by state legislation. 14 The Court reasoned that
where state statutes prohibited certain conduct and congressional
measures imposed taxes on that same conduct, the two lines of
legislation were aimed at achieving the same goal - discouraging
socially undesirable behavior. 1 5
Governmental power to tax illegal conduct remained unques-
tioned until the enactment of the federal income tax in 191316 and
the Revenue Act of 192 1.17 For three decades following these en-
actments, the Supreme Court grappled with the question of
whether gains from illegal conduct were "gross income" for pur-
poses of income taxation.' Finally, in 1961 the Supreme Court
appeared to settle the issue in James v. United States.'9 Uphold-
ing the reasoning in the License Tax Cases, the James Court pro-
13 72 U.S. 462 (1866).
14 Id. at 473 (stating that no contradiction exists by allowing Congress to tax certain
activities which also are prohibited by State law because what state prohibits, federal gov-
ernment discourages by taxation).
15 Id.
16 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
17 Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 250, 268.
18 Compare United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 259 (1927) and Commissioner v.
Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), overruled by James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), with
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). In Sullivan, the Court held that profits de-
rived from illegal liquor sales were subject to income tax. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 259. In its
decision, the Court considered whether gains from illegal sales of liquor were subject to the
recently enacted income tax. Id. at 263. Answering in the affirmative, Justice Holmes
wrote: "We see no reason.., why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from
paying the taxes that it lawful[ly] would have to pay." Id. Nearly two decades later, the
Wilcox Court concluded that embezzled money did not constitute income subject to taxa-
tion. Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 408. The Court, analogizing an embezzler to a bankrupt debtor,
reasoned that because Wilcox obtained the funds without any bona fide claim of right and
remained under a duty to repay, the embezzled funds did not constitute taxable income
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which defined "gross income." Id. Fur-
ther perpetuating the inconsistency, six years after Wilcox, the Court in Rutkin held that
money obtained by extortion was taxable income under the Internal Revenue Code. Rutkin,
343 U.S. at 139. The Court construed the same provision of the Internal Revenue Code as
that subject to interpretation in the Wilcox case. Id. at 130-31. While acknowledging its
holding in Wilcox, the Rutkin court distinguished the two cases, stating that the taxability
of embezzled funds differed from that of extorted funds. Id. at 138. Justice Burton ex-
plained that an extortionist secures money from a victim with his consent, solely by harass-
ing demands and threats of violence. Id. The wrongdoer, therefore, exercises such control
over the funds that, as a practical matter, he derives "readily realizable economic value."
Id. at 137. As a result of the Rutkin decision, the Court left open the question of whether
illegally procured income is subject to taxation.
19 366 U.S. 213 (1961). Similar to Wilcox and Rutkin, the defendant in this case was
convicted of tax evasion for failure to report as gross income unlawfully obtained funds. Id.
at 214. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, noting that the Wilcox and James facts were
'concededly the same." Id.
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claimed that the term "gross income" had long been interpreted to
include gains from unlawful, as well as lawful, activities. 20 The
James Court noted that there had been widespread and settled
administrative and judicial recognition of the taxability of many
types of unlawful gains.2 1 The Internal Revenue Service formally
adopted the James holding by amending its income tax regula-
tions to comport with the decision.22
Although the James opinion sought to establish firmly the doc-
trine that taxation of income derived from criminal activity is con-
stitutional,2 3 taxpayers continued to challenge measures that
taxed specific criminal conduct such as gambling,24 illegal posses-
sion of firearms 25 and the possession of controlled substances.26 In
these leading cases, the Supreme Court recognized the govern-
ment's power to tax criminal conduct providing that any such
measure adheres to constitutional limitations.2 7
In Marchetti v. United States,28 the petitioner challenged fed-
eral wagering tax statutes29 which imposed excise and occupa-
tional taxes, as well as a registration requirement, on those en-
gaged in the business of accepting wagers. While the Supreme
Court found the statute was unconstitutional on self-incrimina-
20 Id. at 218.
21 Id. (quoting Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952)).
22 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1965) (stating that illegal gains constitute
gross income).
23 James, 366 U.S. at 218 ("It had been a well-established principle, long before either
Rutkin or Wilcox, that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are contemplated within the term
'gross income.') (citation omitted); see supra note 18 (describing Rutkin and Wilcox
opinions).
24 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 40 (1968) (challenging federal wagering
tax statutes which imposed occupational tax on those accepting illegal wagers).
25 See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 90 (1968) (challenging National Firearms
Act which required registration and taxation of certain firearms).
26 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 12 (1969) (challenging Marihuana Tax Act
which imposed transfer tax on marihuana illegally imported or brought into United
States).
27 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968) (stating that the "Constitution
... obligates this Court to give full recognition to the taxing powers.. . [b]ut we are equally
obligated to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions which attend the exercise of
those powers").
28 390 U.S. at 39.
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4424 (1988).
30 Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 4401 imposed a ten percent excise tax on the gross amount of wagers
accepted by bookmakers. Id. at 42. Additionally, § 4411 imposed a fifty dollar annual occu-
pational tax on persons subject to taxation under § 4401. Id. Furthermore, § 4412 required
those liable for the occupational tax under § 4411 to register with the director of their local
internal revenue district. Id. These registrants were further required to submit to the In-
ternal Revenue Service a form indicating, inter alia, their name, address, place of business
and whether they were engaged in the practice of accepting wagers. Id.
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tion grounds due to the registration provisions,3 1 the Court care-
fully noted the established rule which states that the unlawful-
ness of an activity does not prevent its taxation.3 2 Moreover, the
Court indicated that nothing in its decision would diminish the
vitality of that doctrine. 3
The same day the Supreme Court decided Marchetti, the Court
rejected similar taxing and registration provisions in Haynes v.
United States.3 4 In Haynes, the petitioner challenged section 5851
of the National Firearms Act3 5 which imposes taxes on certain
classes of illegal firearms. 6 As in Marchetti, the Court upheld the
petitioner's claim that certain registration provisions of the Act
violated the right against self-incrimination. 7 More importantly,
however, the Court emphasized the need to give deference to Con-
gress' taxing powers, while remaining mindful of the limitations
placed upon those powers by the Constitution's other commands. 8
31 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48. The crux of the petitioner's challenge was that the registra-
tion provisions of the federal wagering tax statutes violated his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 41. The Court acknowledged that the obligation to regis-
ter under the statute created a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination. Id. at 48.
32 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968). The Court relied on the License
Tax Cases, a consolidation of cases decided more than a century prior to the Marchetti case;
see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing background and holding of Li-
cense Tax Cases).
33 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 44.
34 390 U.S. 85, 87 (1968); see 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1994). This statute, questioned in
Haynes, applies only to shotguns with barrels less than 18 inches long, rifles with barrels
less than 16 inches long, or other weapons made from shotguns or rifles which are less than
26 inches long. Id.; 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5822. Further, an individual who "transfers" or
.makes" firearms is required to file with the Secretary a written application, indicating
identity of the maker or transferor and transferee, including fingerprints and photographs.
Id.
35 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872.
3 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801(a), 5802. Under the Act, importers, manufacturers, and dealers in
specified classes of firearms were required to pay an annual occupational tax and to regis-
ter with the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. Id. Failure to comply with any of the
Act's requirements were punishable by fines and imprisonment. Id.
37 Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100. The Court found that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination provided a complete defense to prosecutions for failure to comply with
the Act's registration requirement. Id.
Interestingly, Congress responded to the Haynes decision by amending the National
Firearms Act ("NFA"). See 26 U.S.C. 5812(a) (1988). The NFA now provides that no infor-
mation obtained through compliance with the registration requirements shall be used in a
criminal proceeding against the person whose compliance is required. Id.; see also United
States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 123 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Haynes rationale to simi-
lar self-incrimination claim and noting changes to statute subsequent to Haynes decision).
38 Haynes, 390 U.S. at 98 (explaining that courts "must give deference to Congress' tax-
ing powers, and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise); see also Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968) (noting Court's recognition that congressional imposi-
tion of taxes is subject to other constitutional restraints); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300
U.S. 506, 512 (1937) (citing Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911)) (stating that
754 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:747
Nearly three decades following Marchetti and Haynes, the
Supreme Court continues to view the taxing of unlawful activities
as constitutional. Specifically, in the 1993 case of Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,39 the Court reaffirmed this position in
the context of taxing illegal narcotics. 40 Furthermore, at least one
state has expressly recognized this principle when reviewing its
own drug tax statute.4a In State v. Durrant,42 the Supreme Court
"iin the exercise of its Constitutional Power to lay taxes, Congress may select the subjects
of taxation, choosing some, omitting others.").
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Immediately following Haynes and
Marchetti, the Supreme Court decided Leary. In this case customs officials at an American
inspection station stopped a United States citizen, Dr. Timothy Leary, while traveling
across the International Bridge between the United States and Mexico. Id. at 9-10. He was
found to be in possession of marihuana and was subsequently convicted of illegally import-
ing the drug in violation of the Federal Marihuana Tax Act. Id. at 11. Leary successfully
argued that compliance with that Act would require him to incriminate himself by admit-
ting that he possessed contraband. Id. at 16-18. Dr. Leary asserted that by its terms, the
Marihuana Tax Act compelled him to subject himself to a "real and appreciable risk of self-
incrimination." Id. at 16. (citations omitted). Certain provisions of the act required Leary to
identify himself as a transferee who had not registered or paid the tax required under the
statute. Id. A related statutory section mandated that such information be conveyed by the
Internal Revenue Service to state and local law enforcement officials upon request. Id.
Transmittal of this incriminating evidence "would surely prove a significant 'link in a
chain' of evidence tending to establish [Leary's] guilt." Id. (citing Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48).
While the Leary decision did not directly address the right of government to tax illegal drug
possession, the Court substantially relied on the Marchetti reasoning. Id. at 27. The Court
characterized Marchetti as involving an identical self-incrimination claim. Id.
Leary apparently was interpreted to indicate that taxation of illegal drugs is, in and of
itself, constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Alvero, 470 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.
1972). In this post-Leary case, the Fifth Circuit evaluated the Supreme Court's decision,
finding that the Court deemed taxation of illegal drugs constitutionally valid. Id. at 983. In
Alvero, the appellant was convicted of evasion of federal marijuana taxes. Id. at 982. On
appeal, he asserted several grounds, one of which was that Leary invalidated the tax in
question. Id. The Court of Appeals flatly refused such a claim, stating: "We do not agree
with appellant's contention that [Leary]... held collection of the marijuana tax unconstitu-
tional or relieved taxpayers against whom it was properly assessed of the duty to pay it."
Id. at 983.
39 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
40 Id. at 1945. As a case of first impression for the Supreme Court, the Kurth Ranch
decision generated a flood of commentary regarding the constitutional validity of drug tax
statutes. Id. at 1937; see John R. Armstrong II, Note, The Tax Man Cometh, But Fear Not:
The Double Jeopardy Clause Bars Criminal Taxation of Drugs Continent Upon Criminal
Conduct: Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 28 CREiGHTON L. Rv. 475,
476 (1995) (stating that Kurth Ranch decision represents departure from prior precedent);
Curley, supra note 8, at 527 (asserting that Kurth Ranch opinion unnecessarily expanded
Double Jeopardy Clause to apply to civil proceedings); John Hildy, Note, Fifth Amend-
ment-Double Jeopardy and the Dangerous Drug Tax, 85 J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 936,
936-37 (1995) (arguing that Kurth Ranch decision inappropriately expanded Double Jeop-
ardy Clause); Tad Ravazzini, Summary, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch: The Ex-
pansion of Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence into Civil Tax Proceedings, 25 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 331, 359 (1995) (contending that Court's decision ran afoul of Fifth Amendment by
expanding double jeopardy jurisprudence into civil tax proceedings).
41 See State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174 (Kan.), cert denied, Dressel v. Kansas, 492 U.S.
923 (1989).
42 769 P.2d 1174 (Kan.), cert. denied, Dressel v. Kansas, 492 U.S. 923 (1989).
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of Kansas upheld its drug tax law43 by adhering to the United
States Supreme Court's position that unlawful activities may be
taxed under federal as well as state law.44
Based on the established precedent that Congress is within its
right to tax unlawful activities, 45 it appears that states may confi-
dently apply this doctrine to the taxation of illegal drugs. In draft-
ing drug tax statutes, however, states must work within the
bounds of other constitutional restraints.46 As the leading cases
have articulated, deference to Congress' taxing power does not al-
low infringement on basic constitutional rights.47 It is instructive
to examine first the various statutory provisions common to many
state drug tax acts prior to analyzing the possible constitutional
challenges they may face.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Methods of Taxation
Currently, over half of all states have some form of a drug tax
law in place.48 These legislative measures have generated contro-
43 Durrant, 769 P.2d at 1183. The Durrant case was quite similar to Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Id. Durrant involved the Kansas drug tax act which imposed a
tax and registration requirement on dealers of controlled substances. Id. at 1177. Just as in
Leary, the petitioner in Durrant challenged the statute on the basis that the act violated
his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Id. Finding that the confi-
dentiality provisions contained in the Kansas drug tax act were sufficient to protect the
defendant from self-incrimination, the court upheld the act. Id. at 1183.
44 Durrant, 769 P.2d at 1179. The Durrant court stated: "While some have questioned
the propriety of a governmental entity imposing a tax upon an illegal act, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a tax may be imposed on an activity that is wholly or par-
tially unlawful under state or federal statutes." Id. at 1183 (citing Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968)).
45 See supra part I (describing evolving case law which led to Supreme Court precedent
validating taxation of illegal activities); see also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) (indicating government has power to tax possession of illegal
drugs).
46 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's acceptance of
this principle).
47 See supra note 39 (quoting Supreme Court decisions spanning over half of century).
48 See ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (1993); Auz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1201, -1202, -
1203.01, -1204. -1212.02 (Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-28.7-101 to -109 (1994);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-650 to -660 (Supp. 1993); FL.A. STAT. ch. 212, § 212.0505 (1989 &
Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-1 to -11 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-4201 to -4211
(Supp. 1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/1 to /26 (1994); IND. CODE: §§ 6-7-3-1 to -17
(1992); IOWA CODE §§ 453B.1 to .15 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -5211
(1989 & Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:2601 to :2610 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4433-4436 (West Supp. 1993); MASs. GEN. L. ch. 64K, § 8(1) (Supp.
1994); Mm. STAT. §§ 297D.01 to .14 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123
(1993) (repealed 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -4316 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 372A.010 to .150 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18A-1 to -7 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN.
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versy among courts and commentators. Such statutes typically
require monetary payments by individuals found in possession of
controlled substances. 49 The most common means of collecting
these payments is through the use of drug tax stamps.50 These
statutes require taxpayers to purchase stamps from the states's
department of revenue and affix them to the controlled substance
prior to sale, as evidence of tax payment. 5 ' A handful of states
STAT. §§ 105-113.105 to .113 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-01 to -16 (1993); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 68, §§ 450.1-.9 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 44-49-1 to -16 (1993); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 1050A-1 to -15 (1985); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 159.001 to .301 (West
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-101 to -107 (1992); Wis. STAT. §§ 139.87 to .96 (Supp.
1994).
The highest courts of Florida, Idaho, and South Dakota have held their states' drug tax
statute to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See State
Dep't of Revenue v. Herre, 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1994) (striking down statute that
provided for sales tax on transactions involving marihuana and controlled substances as
potentially self-incriminating); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho 1991) (striking
former version of state's Drug Tax Stamp Act but noting that subsequent amendment, cor-
rected constitutional deficiency); State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986) (strik-
ing down state's Luxury Tax on Controlled Substances and Marihuana because it creates a
risk of self-incrimination).
The Supreme Court also has addressed taxation of illegal drugs. See Department of Rev-
enue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (holding Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax
unconstitutional because it constitutes "effective punishment" and thus violates multiple
punishments prong of Double Jeopardy Clause). Proponents of state drug tax statutes have
argued that such measures are an appropriate means of shifting the financial burden asso-
ciated with fighting the drug war from law abiding taxpayers to those who perpetuate the
sale and use of drugs; see, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing). The Chief Justice attacked the majority's decision to strike down Montana's Danger-
ous Drug Tax Act ('the Act"). MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987) (amended
1995). One justification for upholding the Act, stated Justice Rehnquist, was that without
such legislation, "a substantial amount of the illegal drug business will escape taxation
altogether." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952.
Those outside the judiciary also have recognized that equity calls for requiring drug deal-
ers to pay taxes on their ill-gotten gains. See, e.g., Caher, supra note 5, at B2 (reporting
Albany County, New York's District Attorney, Sol Greenberg, as supporting use of tax reve-
nues to help fund increased drug enforcement effort); Ronald D. Clark, Minnesota's Grass
Tax a Model for Nation, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, May 8, 1991, at 12A (quoting executive of
Minnesota's Tax Study Commission as describing state's drug tax as "one of the best pieces
of anti-narcotics legislation to have come along in years"); Tomasson, supra note 6, at Al
(reporting that Minnesota legislature and several others consider approach to be increas-
ingly effective way of striking financially at drug dealers). But see John J. Tigue & Linda A.
Lacewell, Taxes are for Revenue, not Punishment, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 1994, at 1 (arguing
that "defendants should not be disproportionately saddled with the costs of the war on
crime in general").
49 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-4 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-103 (1994); GA
CODE ANN. § 48-15-3 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. tit 36, § 4434 (Supp. 1993).
50 See Frank A. Racaniello, Note, State Drug Taxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23 RUTGERS
L.J. 657, 663-64 (1992) (describing types of state drug taxes and noting that most popular
method of taxation is requiring purchase of drug stamps by individuals dealing in illegal
drugs).
51 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-4 (requiring stamp on controlled substance as evidence
of payment of tax); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-103 (same).
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levy their assessment in the form of an excise tax5 2 and two states
impose a licensing fee.53 Additionally, some drug tax statutes have
provisions wherein tax payments vary depending upon the quanti-
ties and/or types of controlled substances possessed. 54
B. Sanctions for Nonpayment of Tax
Many states charge substantial penalties for nonpayment of the
initial tax.55 Most of the drug tax statutes impose a penalty of
100% of the initial tax on those who fail to pay the original assess-
ment.5 6 Colorado and Illinois impose a penalty of 300% and 400%,
respectively, 57 and Utah's penalty is significantly higher, at
1000%.58 In addition, several states provide that violation of the
civil drug tax statute is punishable as a crime.59
52 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-7. "[Tlax imposed... shall be due and payable at the
time of each use, possession, consumption, storage, or transfer.... ."Id.; Excise taxes do not
provide means for payment before the tax is due or before the deficiency is assessed. Id.; see
BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 563 (6th ed. 1990). An excise tax has been defined as a tax on the
.carrying on of an occupation or activity." Id.
5 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01 (Supp. 1994) "Every dealer selling, offering for
sale or possessing for sale any cannabis or controlled substance on which a tax is imposed
by this article shall obtain from the department a license to sell cannabis and controlled
substances." Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 372A.070 (1993). "A person shall not sell, offer to sell or
possess with the intent to sell a controlled substance unless he first: (a) Registers with the
department as a dealer in controlled substances and pay[s] an annual fee of $250. .. ." Id.;
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.1 (Supp. 1994). The licensing fee is in addition to the taxes
imposed on dealers for possession or sale or drugs. Id.; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372A.070
(1993) (same).
54 See lijima, supra note 6, app. Professor Iijima summarized 23 enacted statutes, all of
which were shown to impose drug taxes based on the amounts and types of drugs possessed
by the obligor. Id. In determining the amount to be assessed, the states typically will tax
the drugs at a different rate, based upon whether the drug is marihuana, a controlled sub-
stance sold by weight, or a controlled substance not sold by weight. Id. Marihuana gener-
ally is taxed at a rate of $3.50 per gram. Id. The survey indicated that 15 of the 23 statutes
tax marijuana at this rate; the remaining rates are either based on ounces or a percentage
of the retail price. Id. Other controlled substances, such as cocaine, are typically taxed at a
rate of $200 per gram. Id. Most statutes provide that controlled substances not sold by
weight shall be measured based on the number of dosage units. Id.
55 See Iijima, supra note 6, app. (indicating that all statutes surveyed provide for some
form of nonpayment penalty).
56 See ALA. CODE § 40-17A-9 (1993); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-660(a) (West Supp. 1993);
IND. CODE § 6-7-3-11(a) (1992); IOWA CODE § 453B.11 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-
5207 (1989 & Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2606 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
§ 297D.09 (Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4310 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 372A.110
(1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.109 (1992); N.D. CENr. CODE § 57-36.1-12 (1993); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 68, § 450.8 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-49-12 (1993); TEx. TAx CODE ANN.
§ 159.201 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. § 139.95(1) (1994).
57 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-101 (1994) (three times amount of tax); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 35, § 520-10 (1994) (four times amount of tax).
58 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-104 (1992) (one thousand times amount of tax).
59 lijima, supra note 6, at app. In Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Texas and Utah, violation of the statute is classified as a felony under state law. Id. In,
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C. Confidentiality Provisions
Compliance with drug tax statutes, such as revealing possession
of specified types and amounts of drugs prior to paying the tax,
may require taxpayers to disclose information which could be used
against them in subsequent proceedings. 60 Further, by requiring
drug dealers to affix stamps to their drugs,6 1 possession of the
stamp alone could evidence possession of illegal substances.6 2
Since compliance with statutory requirements and payments
may cause taxpayers to incriminate themselves, 63 nearly all drug
tax statutes provide confidentiality provisions.6 4 These provisions
generally prohibit tax return information from being used against
the taxpayer in subsequent criminal proceedings.65  To ensure
Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Rhode Island, violation results
in an additional fine and/or imprisonment. Id.
60 See Iijima, supra note 6, at 123-24. In licensing states, those subject to the statute
must reveal their status as sellers of drugs in order to obtain a license. Id. at 124.
61 See Racaniello, supra note 50, at 663-64 (describing use of stamps to assess drug
taxes).
62 See, e.g., State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Neb. 1993). Arguing that Nebraska's
drug tax statute violated his privilege against self-incrimination, Garza asserted that com-
pliance with the act - i.e., receiving the stamps by self-presentation or by having them
mailed to him - would force him to disclose, and thereby incriminate, himself as a posses-
sor of illegal substances. Id.; see also Iijima, supra note 6 at 124 (describing how possession
of tax stamp exposes obligor to risk of self-incrimination).
63 See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986). In Roberts, the Court struck
Minnesota's drug tax statute on the basis that it allowed incriminating evidence to be re-
leased and therefore violated taxpayers' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 961. In analyzing the statute, the court noted that the law's provisions allowed
for disclosure of return information to law enforcement officials. Id. at 690-91. The court
reasoned that filing a return created a high risk of self-incrimination because prosecution
could be based upon tax return information obtained from the secretary of revenue. Id.; see
also State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1993). In Garza, the petitioner argued that the
mere act of purchasing tax stamps under the state's Tax Stamp Act compelled the disclo-
sure of incriminating information. Id. at 452. The court dismissed Garza's argument, not-
ing that the statute's anonymity provisions did not require dealers to pay the tax person-
ally, or use their home mailing address when paying the tax. Id. at 454.
64 See ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-13 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-659 (Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-10 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-4206 (Supp. 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 35,
§§ 520/13 (1994); IowA CODE §§ 453B.10 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5206 (1989 &
Supp. 1992); L. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-2605 (West Supp. 1994); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 64K,
§ 8(1) (Supp. 1994) [OFFICIAL CITE?]; MiNN. STAT. §§ 297D.13 (Supp. 1991); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 77-4315 (1990); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 372A.080 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-
113.112 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-14 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 44-49-14 (1993);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1050A-1 to -15 (1985); TEx. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 159.005 (West
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-105 (1992); Wis. STAT. §§ 139.91 (Supp. 1994).
65 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5210 (prohibiting public employees from disclosing in-
formation required by act and prohibiting use of such information in criminal proceeding,
except to enforce tax itself); State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Kan.) (interpreting
confidentiality provision of statute and finding it provides sufficient protection against self-
incrimination), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989); see also, MINN. STAT. § 297D.13 (Supp.
1991). Illustrative of a typical confidentiality provision, the Minnesota statute provides:
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compliance, several statutes provide criminal penalties for those
who breach the confidentiality provisions.66
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
State drug tax statutes have faced several constitutional chal-
lenges,67 including charges that they infringe on the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination and its prohibition against
double jeopardy. 68 To date, these statutes have withstood most
challenges on these grounds.69 The analyses performed by courts,
Subdivision 1. Disclosure prohibited. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary,
neither the commissioner nor a public employee may reveal facts contained in a report
or return required by this chapter or any information obtained from a tax obligor; nor
can any information contained in such a report or return obtained from a tax obligor be
used against the tax obligor making the return ....
Subdivision 4. Possession of Stamps. A stamp denoting payment of the tax imposed
under this chapter must not be used against the taxpayer in connection with the ad-
ministration or civil or criminal enforcement of the tax imposed under this chapter or
any similar tax imposed by another state or local unit of government.
Id.
66 ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-13 (1993) (Class C Misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-10
(1993) (High and Aggravated Misdemeanor); MiNN. STAT. §§ 297D.13 (Supp. 1991) (Gross
Misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 372A.080 (1993) (Gross Misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 57-36.1-14 (1993) (Class A Misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 44-49-14 (1993) (Misde-
meanor); TEX. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 159.005 (West 1992) (Class A Misdemeanor); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 59-19-105 (1992) (Class A Misdemeanor). But see IND. CODE §§ 6-7-3-1 to -17
(1992). Indiana, however, classifies violation of the confidentiality provision as a felony
with the possibility of loss of employment and time in prison. Id.
67 See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Laws Imposing Tax or License Fee on Possession, Sale, or the Like, of Illegal Narcotics, 12
A.L.R.5th 89, 103 (1993 & Supp. 1995). This survey of recent state drug tax decisions
reveals that such statutes have been challenged as violating constitutional protections of
self-incrimination, due process rights, illegal seizures, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual
punishment, and equal protection. Id.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination pro-
vides that in a criminal case, the defendant shall not be required to testify against himself.
Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense. Id.; see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 14 (containing similar privi-
lege against self-incrimination); IND. CONST. art. I, § 14 (containing similar provision
prohibiting double jeopardy). This Note, while confined to analysis of constitutional chal-
lenges based on the Federal Constitution, recognizes that most state constitutions have
similar provisions.
69 See Catalano, supra note 67, at 103 (observing that most courts considering taxation
of illegal drugs have upheld state drug tax acts); Racaniello, supra note 50, at 666-67 (not-
ing that only constitutional challenges sustained by courts thus far have been those based
on self-incrimination and double jeopardy); see also F. Anthony Paganelli, Constitutional
Analysis of Indiana's Controlled Substances Excise Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 1301, 1303 (1995)
(describing constitutional challenges based on self-incrimination and double jeopardy as
"strongest challenges" to Indiana's drug tax statute).
760 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:747
however, have focused largely on confidentiality provisions7 ° and
whether the taxes are a disguised form of punishment.7'
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that a criminal defendant may not be compelled to incrimi-
nate him/herself.72 Under the Incorporation Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, this right applies to state action.73 This right
has been interpreted and refined by the Supreme Court in deter-
mining whether certain taxing schemes may require divulgence of
self-incriminating evidence.74
In United States v. Kahriger75 and Lewis v. United States,76 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Revenue Act of 1951, 7 7
determining the Act did not compel taxpayers to incriminate
70 See, e.g., State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Iowa 1993). The court held that the
state's drug tax act did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation because the statute assured anonymity to dealers buying drug stamps. Id. But see,
e.g., Herre v. Dep't of Revenue, 617 So.2d 390, 393-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court
found that a provision in the state's drug tax statute which required filing of a sales and
use tax return was unconstitutional as creating a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimi-
nation because the return contained identifying information and could be released to state
and federal law enforcement officers. Id. See generally Alan Daniel Gould, Criminal Law
and the Fifth Amendment: Taxation of Illegal Drugs, 1989 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 541, 550. The
author asserts that "[clonfidentiality is ... the key to ensuring the constitutionality of drug
taxation statutes." Id.
71 See, e.g., Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). The court held that the
defendant, who had been assessed taxes and penalties on the drugs he possessed, was not
subject to double jeopardy by prosecution for the underlying offense of drug possession,
because the tax assessment did not result from the previous criminal judgment. Id. at 662.
But cf Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). The Court deter-
mined that the state's assessment of tax on taxpayer's possession and storage of dangerous
drugs violated the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 1940. The court specifically pointed out,
inter alia, that the tax hinged on commission of a crime and applied only after the taxpayer
had been arrested for the precise conduct that gave rise to the crime. Id. at 1947.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. V (mandating that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . "). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1384-85 (1991)(analyzing Court's expansion of Fifth Amendment protections); Charles E. Moylan, Jr. &
John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
Rxv. 249, 301 (1990) (discussing history of Fifth Amendment privilege).
73 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (extending right against self-incrimination
via Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state actions).
74 See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text (examining development of self-incrimi-
nation analysis in federal cases involving issue of confidentiality in tax and registration
statutes).
75 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
76 348 U.S. 419 (1955), overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
77 Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452 (1951).
1996] TAXATION OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS 761
themselves for past illegal behavior.78 The Act prohibited wager-
ers from accepting bets without first registering with the govern-
ment and paying both an excise and an occupational tax.79 Since
registration and tax information obtained by the government was
available to law enforcement officials,80 the Court was faced with
the issue of whether a wagerer's compliance with the Act risked
self-incrimination.8 ' Reasoning that the registration and payment
of taxes pursuant to the Act were merely conditions precedent to
wagering, 2 the Court held the Act did not violate the right
against self-incrimination because that right applies only to past
acts, not to future acts that may or may not be committed. 3
In Marchetti, the Court, after re-examining its holdings in Kah-
riger and Lewis,84 expanded its view of the protections afforded by
the Fifth Amendment.8 5 The Marchetti court addressed the ques-
78 See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 23-25, 32-33, overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 50-54 (1968); Lewis, 348 U.S. at 422, overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 50-54 (1968).
79 26 U.S.C. § 3285 (a) (Supp. V 1946). The Act provided, in relevant part that "Itihere
shall be imposed on wagers, as defined in subsection (b), an excise tax equal to 10 per
centum of the amount thereof." Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 3290 (Supp. V 1946). The Act further pro-
vided that "[a] special tax of $50 per year shall be paid by each person who is liable for tax
under subchapter A or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person so
liable." Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 3291 (a) (Supp. V 1946). In addition, the Act provided that:
Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall register with the
collector of the district-
(1) his name and place of residence;
(2) if he is liable for tax under Subchapter A, each place of business where the activ-
ity which makes him so liable is carried on, and the name and place of residence of
each person who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf; and
(3) if he is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person liable for tax
under subchapter A, the name and place of residence of each such person.
Id.
80 See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47 (noting availability of information obtained as conse-
quence of federal wagering tax laws to assist enforcement of penalties).
81 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 23.24 (1953) (stating issue on appeal to be,
inter alia, whether registration provisions of federal wagering tax violate privilege against
self-incrimination); Lewis, 348 U.S. at 420 (same).
82 See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 32-33. "Under the registration provisions of the wagering
tax, appellee is not compelled to confess to acts already committed, he is merely informed
by the statute that in order to engage in the business of wagering in the future he must
fulfill certain conditions." Id. (footnote omitted); Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 422
(1955). "If petitioner desires to engage in an unlawful business, he does so only on his own
volition. The fact that he may elect to pay the tax and make the prescribed disclosures
required by the Act is a matter of his choice." Id.
83 See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 36 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that taxing
schemes in question compelled the production of evidence that would be useful in convict-
ing registrants for conspiracy to violate federal and state laws); Lewis, 348 U.S. at 423-25
(Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (same).
84 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 41 (1968) (indicating certiorari granted in
order to "reconsider whether Kahriger and Lewis still have vitality") (footnote omitted).
85 Compare Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51 (adopting standard that right against self-incrimi-
nation was designed to protect guilty as well as innocent persons), with Lewis, 348 U.S. at
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tion of whether a federal wagering statute requiring disclosure of
tax and registration information violated the right against self-
incrimination. 6 The Court held that requiring such information
by law violated this right of wagerers subject to the statute.
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Marchetti, explained
the Court's three-part test to determine whether obtaining infor-
mation pursuant to a tax statute violates the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.88 A taxpayer may successfully assert
that his right against self-incrimination has been violated by the
statute only upon a showing that all three criteria have been
met. 9 The first prong involves two inquiries - whether the tax is
aimed at individuals typically suspected of criminal activities and
whether the taxed activity is in an area permeated with criminal
statutes.90 The second consideration is whether an individual is
required, upon threat of criminal prosecution, to provide informa-
tion he or she might reasonably believe would be made available
to prosecuting authorities. 1 The final inquiry is whether such in-
formation would prove a significant link in a chain of evidence
tending to establish the individual's guilt.92
The Marchetti Court imposed two additional conditions neces-
sary to apply the three-part test. First, the standard needed to
trigger the self-incrimination right is whether the defendant is
confronted by a substantial and real hazard of incrimination. 93
422 (stating that persons can protect themselves from incrimination by ceasing illegal
activity).
86 See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47-52. The Court questioned the constitutionality of the
federal wagering tax statute. Id.; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 63-64 (1968). In
Grosso, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the excise tax imposed by the same
wagering act at issue in Marchetti. Id. The Court's holding paralleled that in Marchetti. Id.
at 64-69; Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1968). In Haynes, the Court ad-
dressed whether the National Firearms Act violated self-incrimination by virtue of its re-
gistration provisions. Id. The Court held that the statute's provision for prosecution for
failure to register under the statute violated the constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 100.
87 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47-48.
88 Id. at 47-48.
89 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-61 (1968).
90 Id. at 47.
91 Id. at 48. The Court pointed out that Internal Revenue Service officials made available
to law enforcement agencies the names and addresses of those who had paid the wagering
tax. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 53 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896)). The Court pointed out that mere "trifling or imaginary" hazards
of incrimination are not "real" for purposes of this standard. Id. (citing Rogers, 340 U.S. at
374; Brown, 161 U.S. at 600).
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Second, when other safeguards are available that are broad
enough to encompass the same protection as afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, a successful claim of self-incrimination will be
precluded. 94
Based on these factors and standards, the Marchetti Court re-
fused to adopt the government's interpretation that the statute
implied restrictions on use of information obtained as a result of
compliance with the statute.9 5 The Court therefore concluded that
the wagering tax statute and attendant registration require-
ments, as they stood,96 violated the self-incrimination right pro-
vided under the Fifth Amendment. 97
The impact of the Marchetti decision, in the context of self-in-
crimination challenges, is evident in subsequent Supreme Court
rulings such as Grosso v. United States98 and Haynes v. United
94 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968) (citation omitted); see State v. Da-
vis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This is an illustrative case in which a state court
determined alternative protections to be "broad enough" to preclude assertions of self-in-
crimination. Id. In Davis, the court upheld its state's drug tax act without relying on the
anonymity provision contained in the act. Id. at 522-23. Instead, the court interpreted an
amended version of the act, which explicitly prohibited disclosure and provided confidenti-
ality, as indicative of the legislature's intent to protect against self-incrimination. Id. at
522. The court reasoned that this judicial grant of immunity was as broad as the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 523; see also State v. Hall, 540 N.W.2d
219, 227 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The Hall court interpreted Wisconsin's drug tax statute to
prevent use by prosecutors of any information acquired as a result of any drug tax stamp
purchase and stated that "the resulting immunity is broad enough to satisfy the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
95 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-60. The Court refused to read the statute as precluding pros-
ecutors from using any information gained as a result of registrants' compliance with the
occupational tax provisions. Id. Such an interpretation would be at odds with legislative
history evincing Congress' intent that the information be made available to law enforce-
ment authorities. Id. at 59-60, 59 nn.15,16.
96 Id. at 60. "[U]nder the wagering tax system as presently written.., petitioner prop-
erly asserted the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. Subsequent to the Marchetti de-
cision, the United States Court of Appeals twice upheld an amended version of the wager-
ing tax statute against claims of self-incrimination. See United States v. Sahadi, 555 F.2d
23, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1977). Sahadi held that the amendments to the wagering statute to be
constitutional based on confidentiality protections they encompassed. Id.; United States v.
Jeffers, 621 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1980). In Jeffers, the Fifth Circuit upheld the amended
version of the statute against a wagerer's claims of self-incrimination. Id. The amendments
deleted the requirement that registrants under the statute conspicuously display their tax
stamp and IRS officials were no longer required to provide tax information to law enforce-
ment authorities. Id. at 225. The Jeffers court noted that the confidentiality provisions in
the amendments were reinforced by a separate statute that penalized government employ-
ees who "leaked" confidential information. Id. at 226. The court recognized that "18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 provides for fines and/or imprisonment and loss of employment for persons making
unauthorized disclosure of confidential governmental information." Id.
97 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49. The Court upheld petitioner's challenge to the wagering
tax statute, concluding that the taxpayer's asserted privilege against self-incrimination
was infringed upon by his compliance with the registration requirements of the wagering
tax provisions. Id. at 61.
98 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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States.99 Both cases were decided immediately following Marchetti
and relied on the Marchetti rationale to strike down registration
statutes as violative of registrants' constitutional right against
self-incrimination. 1 00
In addition, state courts have relied on Marchetti's three-part
test to determine the validity of individual drug tax statutes. In
State v. Garza,10 1 for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that its state's drug tax act did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment.102 Applying the Marchetti rationale, the Nebraska court
found the first part of the test to be satisfied because the tax was
aimed at individuals suspected of criminal activities 10 3 in an area
permeated with criminal statutes. 10 4 The court decided, however,
that the second and third parts of the test were not met, thereby
defeating the taxpayer's self-incrimination challenge.' 0 5 The court
explained that the defendant did not have reason to believe the
information he provided would be available to prosecutors 10 6 be-
cause the statute effectively limited dissemination of information
to prosecuting authorities.1 0 7 Similarly, the supreme courts in
Iowa, Utah, and Minnesota, upholding their state's drug tax laws,
99 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
100 Grosso, 390 U.S. at 69; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 95.
101 496 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1993).
102 Id. at 459.
103 Id. at 453. Those who engage in the possession, manufacture, and delivery of con-
trolled substances are "inherently suspect of criminality." Id.
104 Id. "The possession, manufacture, and delivery of controlled substances is an area
replete with criminal statutes." Id.
105 State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448,453 (Neb. 1993); see also Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 41, 48-61 (1968) (describing test and requirement that all three parts of test be
met to assert successfully self-incrimination challenge).
106 Garza, 496 N.W.2d at 453. Quoting the Nebraska statute, the court stated: "Informa-
tion contained in any report required by the Tax Commission shall not be used against the
dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless independently obtained, except in connection
with a proceeding involving taxes due from the taxpayer making the report." Id.
107 Id. at 453. The court explained that the statute's confidentiality provisions were ef-
fective because taxpayers were not required to receive tax stamps either in person or by
mail. Id. at 454. Furthermore, mailing addresses that were provided in order to comply
with the act were kept confidential. Id. The court continued that the statute disallowed the
use of "leaked" confidential information in a criminal proceeding against the taxpayer. Id.
Finally, the court noted that since the confidentiality provisions of the act provided "protec-
tion as broad in scope and effect as the [self-incrimination] privilege itself" the taxpayer
could not refuse to comply with the act by claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. Id. at 455. But cf Michael A. LeMay, Case Note, Nebraska's Marijuana and Con-
trolled Substance Tax Stamp Act and Self-Incrimination: State v. Garza, 27 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 313, 359 (1993). The author agreed with the Garza decision, but argued that it offered
no guidance to lower courts because it 'hastily resort[ed] to use restrictions ... and fail[ed]
to engage in a critical constitutional analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination .... Id.
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have applied Marchetti's three-part test and have concluded their
statutes contain adequate confidentiality provisions.' 0 8
B. The Protection from Double Jeopardy
In addition to the right against self-incrimination, the Fifth
Amendment provides that no person shall be subjected to prosecu-
tion or punishment twice for the same offense. 10 9 The United
States Supreme Court has determined that the Double Jeopardy
clause protects against three distinct actions beyond the express
language of the Fifth Amendment. 110 These actions include a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after conviction, a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, and multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense."' In drug tax cases, emphasis is
placed on the multiple punishments prong because the issue
arises whether the tax levied constitutes a form of "punish-
ment." 1 2 The Court has concluded that these protections also ap-
ply to the states through the Incorporation Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1
Double jeopardy jurisprudence has long been criticized as lack-
ing in clarity." 4 The multiple punishments doctrine, in particular,
108 See Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 857 (Minn. 1988) (upholding Utah's drug
stamp tax by construing statute to preclude prosecutorial use of information gained as re-
sult of compliance with statute; citing Marchetti); State v. Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852, 856-
57 (Iowa 1992) (upholding Iowa's drug tax act on basis that statute assured anonymity to
dealers who purchased drug tax stamps; referring in its analysis to Marchetti's three part
test and "Marchetti line of cases"); Zissi v. State Tax Comm., 842 P.2d 848, 571-74 (Utah
1992) (concluding that state's drug tax statute contained sufficient confidentiality provi-
sions to withstand claim of self-incrimination; focusing on criteria identified in Marchetti).
109 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
110 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (setting forth three prongs of
Double Jeopardy Clause).
111 Id.
112 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994). The Court
prefaced its opinion with the statement that the issue to be decided was whether a tax on
the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State had imposed a criminal penalty for
the same conduct may violated the multiple punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. Elaborating on that point, the Court explained that the answer to that question
was based on whether Montana's tax constituted a "punishment." Id.
113 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) "[Tlhe double jeopardy prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and
... should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
114 See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (observing that "the
decisional law in the [double jeopardy] area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator"); see also Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeop-
ardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 16 (1983) (stating that double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence is "in a state of disarray"); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term: Leading
Cases, 107 HARv. L. REv. 129, 144, 149 (1993) (asserting that Double Jeopardy Clause is
still "one of the most volatile areas of constitutional criminal law" despite judicial attempts
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has received differing treatment by the Supreme Court.115 In the
context of legislatively imposed sanctions, including taxes, double
jeopardy analysis is applicable depending upon how punishment
is defined by the deciding court.
1 6
In Helvering v. Mitchell,"7 the Supreme Court determined the
proper test for determining whether Congress intended a civil or a
criminal penalty is one of statutory construction. 1 8 According to
the Court, Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanc-
tion with respect to the same act or omission." 9 To support this
proposition, the Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit all second sanctions, only those deemed to be a
second criminal punishment for the same offense.' 20 Over time,
the Court refined this statutory construction test to require a de-
termination of whether Congress expressly or impliedly indicated
a preference for a civil or a criminal sanction.' 2 1 If a court deter-
mined express congressional preference for a civil sanction, it then
had to determine whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in
either purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
22
at clarification); George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REv. 827, 828 (pointing out that "proliferation" of case law and commentary has failed to
establish coherent double jeopardy theory); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a
General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 82 (noting that Supreme Court
had come to recognize its double jeopardy decisions could "hardly be characterized as mod-
els of consistency and clarity" (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).
115 Compare Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 406 (1938) (applying statutory con-
struction to determine congressional intent), with United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
451 (1989) (questioning whether legislatively imposed sanction was rationally related to
goal of statute).
116 Compare Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399-400 (describing legislation as punishment if its
punitive effect outweighs Congress' expressed or implied preference for civil sanction), with
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (defining sanctions as punishment only where their purpose is
solely punitive).
117 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
118 Id. at 406. The case involved a criminal defendant charged with income tax evasion
who was subsequently acquitted. Id. at 396. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause did not bar a civil penalty imposed after the acquittal because the bar applied
only to subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at 398-99. The Court concluded that the sanc-
tion was civil in nature because Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for imposing
the penalty. Id. at 406.
119 Id. at 399.
120 Id.
121 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (clarifying proper application
of statutory construction test).
122 See id.; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In Mendoza-
Martinez, the Court enumerated several factors with which to evaluate the potential puni-
tive purpose or effect of legislative sanctions. Id. at 68-70. These factors include whether
the sanction is traditionally regarded as punishment, whether it promotes the traditional
aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence - and whether it appears excessive.
Id.
1996] TAXATION OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS
The Supreme Court departed from the statutory construction
test when it decided United States v. Halper'2 3 in 1989. One issue
in Halper was whether a civil penalty may constitute punishment
for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 124 The Court looked at
whether the purpose of the sanction was solely punitive.' 25 The
Court determined that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a de-
fendant who has been punished in a criminal prosecution from an
additional civil sanction when that sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial.1 26 The Court explained that a civil
sanction constitutes punishment when it is not rationally related
to the goal of compensating the government for costs resulting
from the defendant's illegal conduct.' 27
The standard applied by the Halper Court expanded double
jeopardy application to apply in civil proceedings. 128 Furthermore,
the Court, by replacing the statutory construction test with the
rational relationship test, disregarded congressional intent. 129
The Court limited its holding to the "rare case" in which the sanc-
tion imposed upon the offender is overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate to the damages he or she caused.130 The Court's narrow hold-
123 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The Halper case involved prosecution of Dr. Irwin Halper for
Medicare fraud. Id. at 437. The government first brought criminal charges against Dr.
Halper for violations of the criminal false claims statute. Id. at 438. Halper was convicted
and sentenced to two years in prison. Id. at 437. The government subsequently filed a civil
action against Halper for violating the False Claims Act pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)
(1988). Id.
124 Id. at 436.
125 Id. at 448-49 (stating that civil sanction constitutes punishment when it serves goals
of retribution or deterrence).
126 Id. at 448-49. The Court's reference to the characterization that the sanction was
"only" a deterrent or retribution indicates that a sanction functioning in part to deter does
not necessarily make that sanction punitive.
127 Id. at 451.
128 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1944-45 (1994) (Scalia
and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (noting that Halper extended prohibition against multiple
punishments to apply to civil penalties); see also Ravazzini, supra note 40, at 338-39 (ob-
serving that Halper marked first time Supreme Court found statutory "civil penalty as
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause"); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases,
108 HA.v. L. REV. 139, 172 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 Leading Cases] (describing Halper
decision as "significantly expand[ing] the constitutional protections available to defendants
by broadening the scope of the multiple-punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy
Clause").
129 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989). The Court stated that the
statutory construction test is "not well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safe-
guarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishments." Id. (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
130 Id. at 449. Under the Court's rationale, the statute in question provided for a fixed
penalty, thus subjecting a "prolific but small-gauge offender" to a sanction disproportionate
to the harm resulting from his actions. Id.
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ing has left lower courts with little guidance on whether to apply
the rational relationship test to future cases.
13 1
The recent Supreme Court decision in Department of Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch1 32 represents the first time the Court has scrutinized
a tax under the multiple punishments prong of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.' 33 In Kurth Ranch, the Court held that Montana's
tax on the possession of illegal drugs, assessed after the state had
imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct, violated the
Fifth Amendment prohibition against successive punishments for
the same offense.1 3 4 The Court stated that the Montana Danger-
ous Drug Tax13 5 was not the kind of civil sanction that may follow
the punishment of a criminal offense.' 36 The Court opined that the
sanction was motivated by punitive rather than revenue-raising
purposes.1 3 7 The Court further held that the state's civil proceed-
ing to collect the tax was the functional equivalent of a subsequent
criminal prosecution placing the Kurths in jeopardy a second time
for the same offense.
138
131 See id. at 449-50 (stating that judgment as to whether government's damages are
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" to harm caused by defendant "often may amount to no
more than an approximation" by trial court); see also Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a
Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRnM. L.
REv. 1, 45 (1993) (arguing that vagueness of Halper's double jeopardy rationale demon-
strates Court may not adequately have assessed effect its decision would have on future
cases).
132 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
133 See id. The Kurth Ranch court stated that: "Although we have never held that a tax
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, we have assumed that one might." Id. Clarifying its
assumption, the Court explained:
In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for example, this Court considered a
Revenue Act provision requiring the taxpayer to pay an additional 50 percent of the
total amount of any deficiency due to fraud with an intent to evade the tax. The Court
assumed such a penalty could trigger double jeopardy protection if it were intended for
punishment, but it nevertheless held that the statute was constitutional because the
50 percent addition to the tax was remedial, not punitive. Id. at 398-405. Although the
penalty at issue in Mitchell is arguably better characterized as a sanction for fraud
than a tax, the Court it interchangeably as a "sanction," id. at 405, 406, and "addition,"
id. at 405, and "assessment," id. at 396, and a "tax," id. at 398, making nothing of the
potential import of the distinction.
Id. at 1945-46 n.16 (citation omitted).
134 Id. at 1948.
135 Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563, 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987)). The Kurth Ranch opinion refers only to the 1987 edition
of the Montana Code, the version in effect at the time of the Kurths' arrest.
136 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
137 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994).
138 Id. at 1948.
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The Kurth Ranch decision was met with three vigorous dis-
sents, 139 and similar to Halper, has failed to provide clear gui-
dance for lower courts and legislatures regarding which tax
schemes may violate the multiple punishments prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 140 The Court did state, however, that it
would uphold the imposition of a drug tax assessed prior to crimi-
nal punishment for the same offense or during the same criminal
proceeding that resulted in a conviction.' 4 '
Certain statutory characteristics may affect whether a drug tax
statute violates the multiple punishments prong of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' 42 Alabama's drug tax act, for instance, was up-
held because it was deemed to serve an expressly stated remedial
purpose. 43 More recently, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found its
drug tax statute did not impose multiple punishments because the
defendant was convicted in a single proceeding for both drug traf-
ficking and for failure to obtain a tax stamp.14 4 Additionally, a
Wisconsin court looked to the amount of penalties imposed and
139 See id. at 1949-60 (setting forth separate dissenting opinions). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist dissented, criticizing the Court's application of a "hodgepodge of criteria" that "drasti-
cally alters existing law." Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice re-
ferred to a long line of cases establishing that a tax that "regulates, discourages or even
definitely deters the activity taxed" is not necessarily invalid. Id. at 1950 (quoting United
States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950)).
Justice O'Connor, also dissenting, argued that the Halper analysis should have been ap-
plied to Montana's drug tax to determine whether it is punitive. Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Applying Halper, Justice O'Connor determined the statute in question served a
"legitimate nonpunitive interest." Id. She referred to the majority opinion as an "unwar-
ranted expansion" of the Double Jeopardy Clause and concluded that the case should have
been remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper application of Halper. Id. at 1955.
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple punishments, but rather multiple prosecutions.
Id. at 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia called on the Court to severely limit and
then concluded that Montana's tax proceeding did not constitute an impermissible second
prosecution. Id. at 1959.
140 See id. at 1946-47 (relying on "unusual features" of Montana's tax; noting high tax
rate, deterrent purpose and provision conditioning tax on commission of crime); see also
1993 Leading Cases, supra note 128, at 172. (describing Kurth Ranch decision as providing
"deeply flawed subjective test that offers little guidance to lower courts or to state
legislatures").
141 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945.
142 See State v. Wengren, 889 P.2d 96, 103 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); State v. Riley, 479
N.W.2d 234, 235-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991), cert. denied, without op., 1992 LEXIS 171 (Ala. Jan. 31, 1992).
143 See Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120, cert. denied, without op., 1992
Ala. LEXIS 171 (Ala. Jan. 31, 1992). The Alabama Court of Appeals upheld its drug tax act,
determining that the statute served its expressly stated remedial purpose. Id. at 124. The
court cited section 40-17A-16 of Alabama's Drugs and Controlled Substances Excise Tax
Act and pointed out that nonpayment penalties are imposed on drug dealers just as they
are on all others who fail to pay their taxes. Id.
144 See Wengren, 889 P.2d at 103.
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ruled the nonpayment penalty assessed against the defendant
under the state's drug tax act was not a punishment within the
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
145
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the developing case law in Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence, a statutory framework may be designed that will promote
the twin aims of state drug tax laws - i.e., extracting otherwise
untaxed gains from drug traffickers while simultaneously protect-
ing their constitutionally guaranteed freedom from self-incrimina-
tion and from double jeopardy. 146
A. Confidentiality Provisions
The cases discussed in Part III reveal that a clear precedent has
been established by the United States Supreme Court 147 and has
been followed by state courts. 148 Confidentiality provisions in drug
tax statutes are a critical component required to protect taxpay-
ers' rights against self-incrimination. 149 The existence of confiden-
tiality provisions alone, however, is not sufficient to safeguard
against the release of taxpayers' information to law enforcement
officials for purposes of obtaining drug convictions. 15 0 To with-
145 See State v. Riley, 479 N.W.2d 234, 235-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). Distinguishing
Halper, the court reasoned that a 'one-for-one" ratio of penalty to tax was effectively reme-
dial rather than punitive. Id. at 236. See generally R. Gustave Lehouch II, Note, A Defini-
tion of Punishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple Punishment
Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632, 656 (1981). The author argues that double jeopardy analysis
must focus on whether punishment is effected rather than merely intended. Id.
146 Compare BALTER, supra note 8, at § 1.02[1] (explaining that appropriateness of tax-
ing illegally procured income is based on premise that failure to do so would unfairly shift
tax burden to law-abiding taxpayers), with Catalano, supra note 67, at 103 (describing nu-
merous judicial opinions in which state drug tax statutes have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds such as self-incrimination, due process, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual
punishment, and equal protection).
147 See, e.g. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1968) (finding federal wager-
ing statute violated right against self-incrimination by virtue of requiring disclosure by
taxpayer's of tax and registration information).
148 See, e.g. State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Neb. 1993) (mandating that informa-
tion in reports required by Tax Commission shall not be used against drug dealers in any
criminal proceeding unless independently obtained).
149 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968). The Marchetti Court firmly
stated that the privilege against self-incrimination may not properly be asserted if other
protection is granted which is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect as the
privilege itself. Id.
150 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1991). In Smith, the court vacated the
defendant's conviction under the 1989 version of the state's Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act,
finding it violative of the right against self-incrimination. Id. at 890. The court, however,
concluded that the 1990 version of the act rectified the asserted deficiencies. Id. Both ver-
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stand challenges under the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, confidentiality provisions of a drug tax statute
should provide for imposition of penalties upon anyone who vio-
lates the statute's nondisclosure provisions. 15 1 This added dimen-
sion will deter misuse of confidential information and, therefore,
provide protection essentially equivalent in scope and effect as
that provided by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 152
B. Penalties for Noncompliance
Drug taxes may deter illegal drug activity, as well as raise reve-
nue, without being invalidated as a form of punishment. 15 3 Impos-
ing excessive nonpayment penalties in addition to the tax, how-
sions of the act required those unlawfully in possession of a controlled substance to
purchase and affix drug tax stamps to that substance or face civil and criminal penalties.
Id. The 1989 version, found unconstitutional, failed to prohibit expressly the use of infor-
mation obtained through the purchase of stamps in unrelated criminal proceedings or in-
vestigations, or to penalize the disclosure of that information by tax commission employees
or agents. Id. Although the 1989 version did provide some confidentiality in that the drug
stamp purchaser was not required to give identifying information when paying the tax, the
court concluded that the act did not provide the functional equivalent of a guaranty against
self-incrimination. Id. In contrast, the court found that the addition of § 63-4206 in 1990,
which provided confidentiality for drug stamp purchasers and added penalties for those
who divulged information, was sufficient to bring the statute within the confines of the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
151 Compare State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1183 (Kan. 1989) (upholding state's drug
tax statute since it prohibited disclosure of any information obtained under the act and
proscribed use of such information in unrelated criminal proceedings), and Sisson v.
Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 574 (Minn. 1988) (upholding state's drug tax act because it suffi-
ciently protected taxpayer's confidentiality), and Lopez v. State, 837 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding statute because it required information obtained to be kept confi-
dential and because act forbade disclosure for any purpose other than related tax proceed-
ing), with Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 15-16 (1969) (holding federal Marihuana Tax
Act unconstitutional as violative of Marchetti because it required taxpayer to identify him-
self and information was available to authorities on request), and State v. Smith, 813 P.2d
888,890 (Idaho 1991) (holding version of state's tax stamp act unconstitutional that did not
provide confidentiality for taxpayer, but also noting that amended version, which did afford
confidentiality, was constitutional), and State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688, 690-91 (S.D.
1986) (holding unconstitutional controlled substances tax act that allowed release of tax-
payer information to law enforcement officials on request), and Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 66-69 (1968) (holding federal wagering tax act unconstitutional because act
did not impose explicit restrictions on use of information obtained through payment of tax).
152 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968). The Marchetti court firmly
stated that the privilege against self-incrimination may not properly be asserted if other
protection is granted which is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect as the
privilege itself. Id.
153 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994) (recogniz-
ing that "neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose" necessarily
characterized Montana's drug tax as form of punishment); United States v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950) (upholding federal tax on marijuana despite its regulatory effect);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1934) (stating that tax does not cease to
be valid merely because it regulates, discourages or deters activities taxed).
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ever, may be viewed as solely punitive rather than as primarily
revenue-raising.15 4 To avoid this result, drug tax laws must not be
designed in a manner which imposes unreasonably high financial
penalties. 155
C. Method and Time of Assessment
The Kurth Ranch decision may have established several means
by which drug tax laws can be formulated to comport with double
jeopardy limitations.' 5 For example, a drug tax proven to recom-
pense for the cost of prosecution and enforcement will likely be
viewed as serving a remedial purpose. 15 7 The Kurth Ranch opin-
ion, supported by years of precedent,15 also indicated that double
jeopardy will not be implicated where a tax and criminal punish-
ment based on the same conduct are imposed during a single pro-
ceeding. 159 Thus, to meet the standards of this framework, states
must consider the magnitude of the taxes imposed as well as
whether criminal acts by taxpayers will trigger imposition of the
tax. The Supreme Court's willingness to strike down drug taxes
as punitive, if they are conditioned on criminal conduct, supports
154 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,452 (1989) (finding statutory penalty
of $130,000 relative to defendant's fraud costing government roughly $16,000 so dispropor-
tionate as to constitute "punishment").
155 See supra note 153 (describing several opinions in which taxes were deemed remedial
because amounts imposed were not considered excessive).
156 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); Ohio v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 493 (1984); In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993).
157 See In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Kurth Ranch, No.
CV-90-084-GF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21133, at *13 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991); In re Kurth
Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 75-76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). The procedural history of the Kurth
Ranch case indicates that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
federal district court and the bankruptcy court, all found that the Minnesota's failure to
present evidence that the tax on the Kurths' drugs compensated the state for its costs in
prosecuting and enforcing the tax against the Kurths, made the tax constitutionally defec-
tive. But see Sorensen v. Department of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29, 33 (Mont. 1992). The Mon-
tana Supreme Court, while Kurth Ranch was pending certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held that the imposition of Montana's drug tax required no proof of the
State's remedial intent because a tax is not a civil sanction to which a Halper analysis
would apply. Id.
158 See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) (explaining that Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments is not applicable where State prose-
cutes defendant for multiple offenses in one trial); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368
(1983) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude, "in a single trial," imposi-
tion of two separate punishments pursuant to two statutes proscribing same offense); Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (finding that imposition of consecutive
sentences did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13
F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that government's contemporaneous pursuit of
criminal and civil sanctions did not come "within the contours of a single, coordinated
prosecution").
159 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
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the proposition that tax statutes must have a primarily revenue
raising-purpose. 160
CONCLUSION
Our nation's illegal drug problem has risen to a level that war-
rants legislative attention. Recently, this focus has resulted in a
revival of taxing illegal drugs. While a certain sense of economic
fairness does seem served by such measures, states must be care-
ful that their drug tax statutes are well-researched and thought-
fully planned.
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court has endorsed the position that the government may consti-
tutionally impose a tax on illegal activities. After the inception of
the income tax in the early part of the twentieth century, the
question arose whether gains from unlawful conduct constituted
"income" for purposes of taxation. The Supreme Court firmly es-
tablished the principle that the unlawfulness of an activity does
not prevent its taxation.
State courts, when evaluating their drug tax laws, have been
concerned with statutes that may not adequately protect the iden-
tity of taxpayers or that may impose an unduly steep penalty for
noncompliance. In light of the judicial concentration on these
statutory characteristics, legislatures considering enactment of a
drug tax statute should consider the impact of these attributes,
such as subjecting taxpayers to self-incrimination and possibly
transforming a purely regulatory measure into a form of
punishment. 161
Current drug tax statutes have the potential for generating rev-
enues to help fight the war against drugs by assessing those who
have directly contributed to the drug problem. Taken too far,
however, some drug tax acts may be viewed as criminal penalties
merely disguised as civil sanctions and thus at odds with the tax-
160 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court explained that conditioning tax as-
sessments on the commission of a crime evidences "penal and prohibitory intent" rather
than an intention to raise revenue. Id. (citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,
295 (1935) (holding tax intended as penal sanction, in part because such was assessed
based on illegal conduct)). However, the absence of such a condition is an indication that
the tax was intended as a civil rather than a criminal sanction. Id. (citing United States v.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950) (finding federal marihuana tax to be civil rather than crim-
inal sanction because tax was not conditioned on crime)).
161 See supra part III (illustrating courts' application of self-incrimination and double
jeopardy analyses to drug tax statutes).
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payers' constitutional rights. To avoid this conflict, drafters
should include effective confidentiality provisions to ensure that
taxpayer information is not used for purposes of prosecuting drug
offenders. Moreover, drafters of drug tax acts should consider
whether the rate of tax assessment satisfies a primarily revenue-
raising purpose or effectively serves as a form of monetary punish-
ment. A properly drafted drug tax act will allow states their tradi-
tional latitude in raising revenues and will comport with taxpay-
ers' constitutional rights. 162
Amy Bucci
162 See supra part III (discussing self-incrimination and double jeopardy doctrines).
Challenges based on other than Fifth Amendment rights have been brought against some
state's drug tax laws; Catalano, supra note 67, at 103 (noting challenges based on due
process, illegal seizure, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protection). So far, how-
ever, the only challenges upheld have been based on self-incrimination and double jeop-
ardy. See also Racaniello, supra note 50, at 666-67 (stating that only self-incrimination and
double jeopardy challenges have thus far been upheld). Accordingly, those other constitu-
tional issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
